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Abstract 
In recent years, there have been growing concerns on the issue of parallel trade on 
pharmaceuticals. It is an existing issue in European Union and an emerging issue in the 
North America and Asia. In this paper, a model is developed to explore the impact of 
parallel trade on: 1) profits of pharmaceutical firms, 2) drug price, supply and social 
welfare in the importing country, and 3) drug price, supply and social welfare in the 
exporting country.  The possible policy reactions of the governments in the two countries 
are also discussed. By relaxing some assumptions, I extend the existing studies to a more 
general framework. I found that firm’s total profits and social welfare in the importing 
country may increase or decrease. This finding is contradicted to an existing study 
because of the relaxation on some assumptions. Parallel trade will lead to a higher drug 
price and then a social welfare loss in the exporting country; under certain circumstances, 
the pharmaceutical firm may cut off the drug supply. The results show that the negotiated 
price in the presence of parallel trade is sensitive to the market size of the drug and 
transaction cost of parallel trade. Therefore, those factors have important policy 
implications to the policy maker in the exporting country. For the importing country, the 
social welfare change when parallel trade is legally permitted is closely related to the 
firm’s bargaining power in the foreign market, which should be considered by the policy 
maker. 
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1. Introduction  
 In most industrialized countries, the GDP share of total health care costs has 
grown rapidly in recent years. Among the health care costs, pharmaceutical cost has 
increased at a more rapid rate than that of any others. Therefore, more and more attention 
is being been paid to pharmaceutical issues.  
 Pharmaceutical prices vary significantly between countries, even among those at 
the same level of development. This price disparity derives mainly from two sources: 1) 
the difference in pharmaceutical price regulations between countries 2) the difference in 
the demand for pharmaceuticals between countries.  
 In recent years, governments have become more and more involved in the 
financing of health care. Under increasing budgetary pressures, governments have strong 
incentives to reduce health care and pharmaceutical costs. Pharmaceutical price control in 
many countries is a reflection of this situation. Pharmaceutical price control can take 
many forms, such as direct price control (as in Canada, France, Italy and Spain), 
reference pricing, compulsory licensing (as in Canada before 1987), and others. Price 
control is commonly believed to be an important factor that leads to the pharmaceutical 
price discrepancy between countries. For example, pharmaceutical prices in Canada have 
been regulated by the Patented Medicine Price Review Board (PMPRB) since 1987. 
Meanwhile, there is no such regulation in the U.S. During that same period, the average 
U.S. price for patented drugs has been 36 percent to 67 percent higher than the average 
Canadian price1. Although differences in the health care systems, income levels and other 
country-specific factors could contribute to this price discrepancy, many researchers 
believe that price regulation in Canada plays an important role.  
 At the same time, countries vary in the characteristics of their health care systems, 
income levels, and other country-specific factors such as physician and patient 
behaviours, also population health status. These factors lead to differing demands for 
pharmaceuticals between countries and hence to the differences in drug prices. 
 The arbitrage opportunity resulting from price discrepancies opens the door to 
parallel trade. Parallel trade is the importation of pharmaceuticals from a country where 
prices are low to a country where price are high without the authorization of a trademark, 
copyright, or patent holder. Parallel trade is legally permitted inside the European Union. 
For example, in the United Kingdom, the Department of Health encourages pharmacists 
to buy parallel imports when they are cheaper than domestic products. Fifteen percent of 
domestic pharmaceutical consumption is imported from Spain and Italy. Parallel trade is 
used as a policy tool to contain pharmaceutical costs in the health care system. Although 
parallel trade is not legally permitted in North America, it is an emerging issue. Because 
of the price discrepancy between the United States and Canada, more and more 
Americans buy their prescription drugs from Canadian pharmacies, either by on-line 
ordering or organized tours. As a result of public outrage over the drug price differential 
between the two countries, in 2000, the US congress passed the Medicine Equity and 
Drug Safety Act, which would allow Canadian drugs to be re-imported into the US. 
President Clinton vetoed the legislation, ostensibly for safety reasons. However, this 
remains an important policy issue both in the US and Canada, reflected, for example, in 
                                                 
1 See the article “Prescription Drug Prices in Canada: What Are the Lessons for the U.S.?” by Gross D. 
Available at (7/1/2005):   http://www.aarp.org/international/Articles/a2003-07-11-ia-perspectives.html
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Health Canada’s suppression of internet pharmacies in 2004, and another round of hot 
debate on the same issue in the 2004 presidential election campaign in the U.S. 
The presence of parallel trade in pharmaceuticals causes strategic reactions of 
pharmaceutical firms, which raise several interesting questions: 1) the change of firm’s 
profits in the presence of parallel trade 2) drug price, supply and social welfare in the 
importing country 3) drug price, supply and social welfare in the exporting country  
With this paper, I would like to contribute to the ongoing analysis and debate over 
issues related to parallel trade, and pay particular attention to the above three questions. I 
will explicitly take into account the feature of different demands on pharmaceuticals 
between countries, and pharmaceutical price control in the exporting country. The 
analysis will be conducted through a two-stage game approach, in which the first stage is 
a Nash bargaining game on the drug price between the pharmaceutical firm and the 
government in the exporting country, and the second stage is a Cournot competition 
between the firm and parallel trader in the importing country. 
 The analysis is organized as follows. In the next section, I will review a few 
studies related to my work. The third section presents my model. The final section 
contains my conclusions, policy implications, and discussion. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 The literature is not large, but it has been growing rapidly in recent years. To date, 
most of these are studies from a policy perspective without a rigorous theoretical 
foundation. I review the three theoretical studies most related to my work.  
 
Pecorino (2002) 
 This paper is a direct response to the legislative debate about whether the US 
should allow low price prescription drugs to be reimported from Canada. In this paper, a 
model is developed in which a drug is sold in both a foreign and a home country. When 
parallel trade is not allowed, the monopolistic pharmaceutical firm sets MR equal to MC 
in its home market to determine the optimal price, and the price in the foreign country is 
the solution of a Nash Bargaining game between the firm and the foreign government; 
given by 
 
*
* 1[ ( )] [ ( *)]
P
Max kCS p k pα απ − ,       (*) 
 
where CS is the consumer surplus in the foreign country, and π  is the firm’s profit in the 
foreign country. The author assumes that the demands in the two countries are identical 
in all aspects except size, which is reflected by a scaling factor k. α  measures the 
bargaining power of the foreign government. When parallel trade is permitted, the author 
assumes that there will be a uniform price in the two markets. This price is the solution to 
the problem 
 
                    
*
* 1[ ( )] [(1 ) ( *) ]m
P
Max kCS p k p ,α απ π −+ −    (**) 
 
Here, (1 ) ( *)k pπ+  is the firm’s total profit in both markets under the uniform price, and 
mπ  is the firm’s profit if the drug is sold only in the home market, with no supply to the 
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foreign country. Pecorino analyses two different cases: linear demand and constant 
elasticity of demand. In both cases, the author finds that both the firm’s profit and the 
domestic consumer surplus rise when parallel trade is legally permitted. That is because 
the firm bargains harder on the price under parallel trade. That implies the negotiated 
price under parallel trade has to be higher than in the absence of parallel trade, otherwise, 
there will be no supply to the foreign market.  
 There are two important assumptions in this model. First, the assumption of 
identical demands in the two countries is crucial to the conclusion about the firm’s profit. 
The author has made this assumption based on the fact that the countries (EU, Canada, 
Japan, etc.) in question are all highly developed countries with similar levels of income. 
Therefore, the drug price discrepancy between countries occurs only because of drug 
price control. However, price control is only one of the reasons that lead to drug price 
discrepancy between countries; different demand between them is also an important 
factor. For example, the drug price discrepancy between Portugal and U.K is caused not 
only by price regulation, but also by differences in income between the two countries. 
Furthermore, in considering the different characteristics of health care systems and drug 
insurance coverage (public and private), identical demands (i.e. same demand elasticity 
and maximal willingness to pay) between countries is a questionable assumption, even 
for those countries at the same level of development. Therefore, identical demand can 
only be regarded as a special case. Second, the assumption of uniform price in both 
countries in the presence of parallel trade may also be unrealistic. Price in the importing 
country is related to the parallel trader’s costs, a fact that has important policy 
implications. And also, the parallel trader has to face the price competition from the 
manufacture in the importing country. 
 
Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) 
In this paper, the authors develop a model in which a manufacturer competes in its 
home market with parallel trade firms. The home country is the high price country and 
the foreign country is the low price country. In the foreign country, the pharmaceutical 
prices are regulated. A distinct feature of this model is that multiple parallel traders 
jointly choose the maximum amount of parallel trade. It is a three stage game. At the first 
stage, n symmetric parallel importers enter the market, applying for a license from the 
authority in the home country at a cost T. Parallel traders will enter the market if the 
expected profit is non-negative. At the second stage, each parallel trader chooses its own 
quantity based on the regulated price in the foreign country and the transaction cost t. At 
the final stage, the manufacturer sets its price in the home country by taking into account 
the amount of parallel trade. The model is solved by backward induction. If the trade 
costs (T and t) are not too high, the manufacturer will accommodate the parallel trade. 
The equilibrium number of parallel traders and quantity of parallel trade can be found. 
The price in the home market is lower than in the absence of parallel trade. Using data 
from Sweden, the authors found that the prices of drugs subject to competition from 
parallel trade fell relative to other drugs over the period 1994-1999. The econometric 
analysis confirms the theoretical prediction. 
 The most important feature of this model is the limited quantity of parallel trade. 
The quantity is jointly determined by the manufacturer and parallel traders. This will not 
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lead to a uniform price in two countries under parallel trade as is assumed in Pecorino. 
Therefore, it makes the model more realistic.  
 Nevertheless, this analysis is “one-sided”. The authors consider only the price 
change and the reactions of the interested parties in the home market. They do not 
examine the impact of parallel trade on the foreign market (i.e. the price and supply of the 
drug, and social welfare). Moreover, this analysis ignores the influence of foreign 
demand (and hence manufacturer’s profit in the foreign market) on the manufacturer’s 
decision in the home market, as well as the interaction between the foreign government 
and the manufacturer.  
 
Jelovac and Bordoy (2005)  
 In this paper, the authors consider the changes of price and welfare after parallel 
trade is legally permitted. There are two important features of their model. First, the two 
countries have different demands. Country i’s demand is i i iD ipθ α= − , where iθ  reflects 
the different value that consumers put on the drug and iα  reflects the difference in the 
patients’ level of co-payment. Second, the consumer puts a lower value on the reimported 
drug than on the one originally offered by the manufacturer, so their prices are not the 
same. The model is a three stage game. At the first stage, the firm maximizes its profit by 
taking into account parallel trade. At the second stage, the parallel importer sets a price to 
maximize his profit. At the final stage, the consumers in each country choose to consume 
one unit of the drug supplied either by the monopolist or by the parallel trader, depending 
on the price. The game is solved by backward induction. The equilibrium has several 
interesting characteristics. First, prices tend to converge under parallel trade, that is, the 
price in the low price (exporting) country is higher and the price in the high price 
(importing) country is lower than without parallel trade. Second, the effect of parallel 
trade on the total welfare is ambiguous except for a few extreme cases. Third, the 
different co-payment rates have an influence on parallel trade. 
 Modifying two aspects of this model may have important implications for the 
impact of parallel trade.  The first is price regulation. In Jelovac and Borday assume that 
the firm can freely set a price. However, many studies argue that low price (which gives 
the incentive to parallel trade) is the result of price regulation. When a firm reacts to 
parallel trade under circumstances of price regulation, and its power to set a price is 
limited, the story might be different. Second, in this paper, the total welfare is defined 
as A B A B mTW CS CS PE PE wπ π= + − − + + , where PE is the public expenditure paid by 
the government, and the last two terms are the profit of the monopolist firm and parallel 
trader. However, in the long run, total welfare is much more difficult to define if we take 
into account some other concerns such as R&D of pharmaceuticals. 
 
In general, among the existing studies, very few have focused attention on the low 
price (exporting) country. Their analyses deal mainly with the price and welfare in the 
importing country. However, if parallel trade were legally permitted, the consequences 
for the low price country are also very important. Parallel trade will affect the profits of 
the pharmaceutical industry, and the reactions of that industry could have an impact on 
the national pharmaceutical price control system, on the drug supplies, and more 
generally on price negotiations between the pharmaceutical industry and each 
government. If a compromise on price cannot be reached, the pharmaceutical 
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manufacturer may cut off the supply of the drug to that market. For example, Danzon 
(1998) notes that Glaxo delayed for several years to launch its antimigraine product 
sumatriptan (Imigran®) in France, rather than accepting a low price that would have 
undercut its higher price elsewhere.  
 The model I develop below makes a series of contributions: 
(1) I consider the impact of parallel trade on drug price, supply, and associated social 
welfare in the low-price (exporting) country; social welfare in the importing country; and  
the firm’s total profit. 
(2)  I consider not only price control in the low-price country, but also the influence of 
the different characteristics of the demand in the two markets on the question of a firm’s 
decision, its profit and the equilibrium price in the exporting country.  
(3) I consider in more detail on possible policy reactions of the government in the low-
price country and explore potential policy options for the high-price country. 
 
3. A Model of Parallel Trade 
 
Assumptions 
I assume that there are two countries, H and L. A monopolistic pharmaceutical 
manufacturer produces and sells a patented drug in both H and L. The pharmaceutical 
prices are regulated in country L. The price of this drug in country H ( Hp ) is higher than 
the price in country L ( Lp ). The manufacturer is located in H. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that the firm produces at zero cost. In addition, the demands for this drug are 
different in the two countries. Demand is 1 Hq p= −  in country H, and L Lq pα= −  in 
country L. Hp  and Lp  are the price of this drug in country H and country L respectively. 
α  is assumed to be smaller than 1, so that the monopoly price in country H is higher than 
the monopoly price in country L. Since the two demands have same slopes, α  is an 
unambiguous measure of market size.  These demand specifications are tractable and 
allow me to determine the influence of market size. Without parallel trade, the firm acts 
as a profit-maximizing monopolist in country H, setting its marginal revenue equal to the 
marginal cost. For the given demand function, the monopoly price for the firm is ½, q is 
½ and profit ( mπ ) is ¼. In country L, pharmaceutical price is lower than that in country 
H. The price in country L is determined in a bargaining process between the firm and the 
government of country L. If parallel trade is allowed, the parallel trader purchases the 
drug in country L at the negotiated price Lp , and ships it to country H with a transaction 
cost t. This t is assumed to be less than ½, since parallel trade is clearly impossible if it is 
higher.   In contrast to the assumption of multiple parallel traders in Ganslandt and 
Maskus (2004), I assume a single parallel trader. Once again, this is for the ease of 
calculation2. Under parallel trade, total sales in country H are H Tq q q= + , where Hq  is 
the quantity sold by the firm and  is the quantity sold by the parallel trader. The profit 
of the parallel trader is denoted 
Tq
Tπ ; the profit of the firm in country H under parallel 
trade is denoted Hπ  and its profit in country L is denoted Lπ .  
                                                 
2 This simplification does not change the direction of the fundamental conclusions. 
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 An equilibrium under parallel trade consists of the quantities , Lq Hq  and  and 
the prices 
Tq
Lp  and Hp . The equilibrium is obtained in two stages. In the first stage, the 
firm and the government in country L negotiate the price of the drug Lp , which is the 
solution of a generalized Nash Bargaining game. In the second stage, in country H, the 
monopolist and the parallel trader engage in Cournot competition which determines the 
equilibrium price Hp  and the quantities Hq  and .Tq
3  The firm and the parallel trader, 
taking each other’s sale as given, choose their own sales so as to maximize their own 
profits. The price Hp  is the highest price at which all of the drug can be sold. Also,  is 
the quantity of goods demanded by the consumers in country L when the price is
Lq
Lp . As 
usual, the equilibrium is solved by backward induction. 
 
Cournot Competition in Country H 
 Under parallel trade, the firm’s profit in market H is H H H L Tp q p qπ = + . The first 
term is the profit made from the firm’s own sale in market H, and the second term is the 
profit made from the sale to the parallel trader. The parallel trader buys this drug at Lp  in 
country L and sells it at Hp  in country H.  Given the demand functions, the firm’s profit 
is 
[ ]1 ( )H H T H Lq q q p qπ = − + + T                            (1) 
 
The parallel trader’s profit is  
[ ]1 ( )T H T Lq q p t qπ = − + − − T                             (2) 
 
The firm and the parallel trader, taking each other’s sale as given, choose their own sales 
so as to maximize their own profits. Solving out the Cournot equilibrium,  
 
1 1if
3
1 otherwise
2
L
L
H
p t
2
p t
q
+ +⎧ ≤ −⎪⎪= ⎨⎪⎪⎩
                         (3) 
                   
1 2( ) 1if
3
0 otherwis
L
L
T
p t
2
e
p t
q
− +⎧ ≤ −⎪= ⎨⎪⎩
                    (4) 
 
If the price of the drug in country L is higher than 1
2
t− , there would be no parallel trade 
because the acquisition cost to the parallel trader is too high.  
                                                 
3 The idea is that the parallel trader and the firm have to compete with each other. We can change the 
assumption as the firm being a Stackberg leader, which will change the specific solutions of the model, but 
it does not change the direction of the conclusion.  
 7
The highest price Hp  at which all of the goods can be sold is: 
 
          
1 1if
3
1 otherwise
2
L
L
H
p t
2
p t
p
+ +⎧ ≤ −⎪⎪= ⎨⎪⎪⎩
                                            (5) 
 
Substituting equation (3), (4) and (5) into equation (1), the firm’s profit in country H is 
 
        
2 1(1 ) 3 (1 2 2 ) / 9 if
2
1   otherwise
4
L L L L
H
p t p p t p
π
⎧ ⎡ ⎤+ + + − − ≤ −⎣ ⎦⎪⎪= ⎨⎪⎪⎩
t
      (6) 
 
Parallel trade keeps Hπ  below ¼ until the price in market L is high enough to drive out 
the parallel trader. As Lp  approaches 
1
2
t−  from below, Hq , Hp  and Hπ  converge to the 
monopoly solution while  and Tq Tπ  converge to zero. There are no discontinuities in any 
of the variables when the parallel trade drops out of the market.  
 The firm’s profit in country L is 
 
        
( ) if
0  otherwise
L L L
L
p p pα α
π
− ≤⎧⎪= ⎨⎪⎩
                                                    (7) 
 
The firm’s total profit in both markets is H Lπ π π= + . Clearly, Lπ  is increasing in α  and 
is maximized at 
2L
p α= . Differentiation shows that Hπ  is increasing in Lp and t 
when 1
2L
p t≤ − . 
        (5 10 4 ) / 9 0H L
L
p t
p
π∂ = − − >∂   if 
1
2L
p t≤ −                              (8) 
 
        (2 4 2 ) / 9 0H Lp tt
π∂ = − + >∂   if 
1
2L
p t≤ −                             (9) 
 
Functions Lπ  and Hπ  are both continuous; Lπ  is concave over the domain 0 Lp α≤ ≤ , 
and Hπ  is concave over the entire domain. And Hπ  is always kinked at 12Lp t= − . 
 
First Stage 
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 At the first stage, the firm and the government in country L negotiate the price Lp .  
Like Pecorino (2002), I assume that the negotiated price is determined by a generalized 
Nash bargaining game. The pay-off of the government in country L is the consumer 
surplus gained by the consumers if the good is made available in market L, and the firm’s 
pay-off is the difference between its profits if it sells in both markets (π ) and its profit if 
it sells only in market H ( mπ ). If they agree on a price, that price maximizes a weighted 
geometric average of their pay-offs, where the weights reflect bargaining power. If the 
firm cannot attain profits of at least mπ  by selling in both markets, it will not agree to sell 
in market L.  
 The price chosen is determined by the following generalized Nash bargaining 
game: 
             [ ]
1
( ) ( )
L
m
L L
p
CS p pMax
γ
γ π π
−⎡ −⎢⎣ ⎦
⎤⎥                 (10)    
 
where   
             21CS( )= ( )
2L
p α − Lp                                 (11) 
              
In equation (10), γ  is the bargaining power of the government in country L ( 0 1γ< < ); 
mπ is ¼.    
 
Figure-1, circumstances of no agreement between the firm and government L 
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For everyγ , there are some circumstances in which there will be no agreement 
between the firm and government L. If the market size in country L (α ) is so small that 
the firm’s best profits when it sells in both markets are smaller than mπ , the firm will cut 
off the supply to market L. This situation is illustrated by Figure 1.  
There are some α (smaller than 1
2
t− ) such that the firm’s best profits when it 
sells in both markets under parallel trade are just equal to mπ . Call this value *α and let 
*
Lp be the associated profit-maximizing price.
4  If α  falls below *α , profits in both 
markets are smaller than mπ   at every Lp  that is smaller than α . Since the firm’s 
maximal total profits in the two markets are smaller than mπ , the firm will cut off the 
supply to market L. If α  rises above *α , profits are greater at every Lp  that is smaller 
than α , and there will be an agreement that benefits both parties. Henceforth α  will be 
assumed to lie between *α  and 1 so that there is an agreement.  
Next, I analyze the equilibrium in three different cases: 0γ = , 1γ =  and 0 1γ< < .  
 
 
0γ =  Case 1: 
 When 0γ = , all the bargaining power resides with the firm. The generalized Nash 
Bargaining game simplifies to the firm’s profit maximization. The firm acts as a 
monopolist in market L and can freely choose the price Lp to maximizeπ . There are two 
components in the firm’s total profitπ : profit in market L ( Lπ ) and profit in market H 
( Hπ ). Based on equation (6) and (7), the solution of the firm’s profit maximization is 
 
       
if 1 2
2
1 8if 1 1 2
2 3
(5 9 4 ) 8  if 1
28 3
L
t
p t t
t t
α α
α
α α
⎧ > −⎪⎪⎪= − − < < −⎨⎪ + −⎪ < −⎪⎩
t                    (12) 
 
The intuition behind equation (12) is as follows.  
(a) The monopoly price in market L is
2
α . If 
2
α is greater than 1
2
t− , the profit function 
looks like that in Figure 2. The firm maximizes its profits by charging the monopoly price 
in both markets; the gap between the two monopoly prices is too small to allow the 
parallel trader to operate.  
                                                 
4 The firm’s best profit is achieved when it has all the bargaining power and can freely choose the price to 
maximize its profits. In this context, by setting 1/ 4L Hπ π+ = , we can find 
* 22 14(5 / 4 2 ) 5 4 / 9t t tα ⎡ ⎤= − − − +⎣ ⎦  
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 (b) If 
2
α is between 1 4
2 3
t−  and 1
2
t− , the profit function looks like that in Figure 3. 
When the price Lp exceeds 2
α , the firm’s profit in market L begins to fall, but the firm’s 
profit in market H increases since the higher Lp  reduces the quantity of parallel trade. 
The increase of Hπ  outweighs the fall of Lπ . Therefore, the optimal price for the firm 
“hangs up” at 1
2
t− .  
 
(c) If 
2
α is smaller than 1 4
2 3
t− , the profit function looks like that in Figure 4. The optimal 
price for the firm is (5 9 4 ) / 28Lp tα= + − . When the price Lp exceeds 2
α , the firm’s profit 
in market L begins to fall, but its profit in market H increases. The fall of Lπ  is smaller 
than the increase of Hπ  if (5 9 4 ) / 28Lp tα< + − , and greater than the increase of Hπ  
if (5 9 4 ) / 28Lp tα> + − .  At (5 9 4 ) / 28Lp tα= + − , the absolute values of the slopes of Lπ  
and Hπ  are equal. Therefore, the optimal price for the firm is (5 9 4 ) / 28Lp tα= + − .   
 
 
Figure-2, large market in country L 
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How does the price vary with α  and t? An examination of equation (12) shows 
that Lpα
∂
∂  is positive as long as 
1
2L
p t≠ − , and Lp
t
∂
∂  is positive so long as there is parallel 
trade.             
An increase in α  for a given t increases the equilibrium price Lp except when α  
is still in the range of 81 1
3
t α− < < − 2t , over which the equilibrium price Lp hangs up 
at1/ . A larger market size allows the firm to charge a higher price. In Figure 2 and 
Figure 4, an increase in 
2 t−
α  increases the slope of Lπ  and hence π  at each Lp , so that the 
stationary point lies farther to the right: equilibrium Lp  rises withα . Whenever α  is still 
in the range of 81 1
3
t α− < < − 2t , the analysis in part (b) above continues to hold. 
Therefore, the equilibrium price Lp hangs up at1/ 2 t− .  
 Similarly, a decrease in t (for a given α ) in the presence of parallel trade makes 
the graph of Hπ  and then π  steeper at each Lp , shifting the stationary point to the right, 
so that the equilibrium price rises as the transaction cost falls. A falling transaction cost 
increases competition from the parallel trader, so the firm raises Lp  to limit the parallel 
trader’s activity.    
 What are the effects of a change in α  or t on the firm’s total profits? Recall that 
0Lππα α
∂∂ = >∂ ∂  whenever Lp  is less than α . Likewise, 0
H
t t
ππ ∂∂ = >∂ ∂  whenever there is 
parallel trade. An increase of α  increases the firm’s profit in market L at each Lp  
smaller thanα , and hence the firm’s maximal total profits must also rise. Under parallel 
trade, an increase of t reduces the quantity of parallel trade, so that the firm’s profit in 
market H increases. When 1
2L
p = − t , the increase of t means that the firm could charge a 
lower price that is closer to the monopoly price / 2α  in market L, so that the firm’s profit 
in market L increases. The increase of t shifts the graph of π  upward at each Lp  smaller 
than 1
2
t− , so long as Lp  is initially below 12 t− . Consequently, the firm’s maximal 
profits rise.  
 The consumer surplus in country L is given by equation (11). Differentiation 
shows that 
 
( ) ( )(1 )L L
CS p ppαα α
∂ = − − >∂ ∂ 0
L∂                                 (13) 
 
( ) ( )( )L L
CS p pp
t t
α∂ = − − <∂ ∂ 0
L∂                                   (14)  
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whenever there is parallel trade. Since Lpα
∂
∂  is always smaller than one, an increase of α  
in country L must increase the consumer surplus. Similarly, since an increase of t in the 
presence of parallel trade decreases the equilibrium price Lp , it must increase the 
consumer surplus in country L.   
   
1γ =  Case 2: 
 When 1γ = , all the bargaining power resides with the government in country L. 
From equation (10), we can see that the problem is simplified to the maximization of 
consumer surplus in country L. The government in country L will choose the lowest price 
that the firm will accept, which is the price that sets 0mπ π− = : 
 
2 2 5(5 9 4 ) (5 9 4 ) 56( 2 ) / 28
4L
p t t t tα α⎡ ⎤= + − − + − + + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
              (15) 
  
This Lp  is the point at which the profit function π  in Figure 2, 3 and 4 cuts the line with 
height ¼. An increase of α  or t shifts the graph of π  upward; therefore, the intersection 
of the profit function π  and line of ¼ moves left. The new equilibrium price is lower 
than before.5 If the market size in country L is bigger, the firm’s lowest acceptable price 
would be lower. A larger market in country L make it easier for the firm to compensate 
its profit loss in country H. Higher transaction costs reduce the quantity of parallel trade 
and hence the profit loss in country H; therefore, the firm’s lowest acceptable price in 
market L is decreasing in t. Since the consumer surplus in country L is increasing in α  
and decreasing in Lp , a larger α  or t increases consumer surplus. 
  
Case 3: 0 1γ< <  
 When the bargaining power is between 0 and 1, we should have the same three 
cases as we saw when the firm has all the bargaining power. When the market size is 
large and firm has high bargaining power, the equilibrium Lp  could be large enough to 
prohibit parallel trade. When the market size is relatively small and the firm has low 
bargaining power, the equilibrium Lp  is below
1
2
t− , the firm accommodates parallel 
trade. The intermediate case is that the firm chooses a price hanging up at 1
2
t− . It is 
difficult to explicitly solve out the equilibrium price for the general case. But we can 
explore the property of the equilibrium price as follows. If the price is greater than or 
equal to 1
2
t− , there will be no parallel trade. Therefore, I focus my analysis only on the 
 
 
−
                                                 
5 The effects of a change in α  or t on the equilibrium price Lp  can also be shown by differentiations, 
please see the details in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. 
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case where the price is smaller than 1
2
t− , i.e. the firm accommodates parallel trade. The 
first and second order conditions of equation (10) are 
 
'( ) ( ) (1 ) '( ) ( ) 0mL L L LCS p p p CS pγ π π γ π⎡ ⎤− + − =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦                              (16)
 6
 
 
"( ) ( ) '( ) '( ) (1 ) "( ) ( ) 0mL L L L L LCS p p CS p p p CS pγ π π π γ π⎡ ⎤Γ ≡ − − + − <⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦          
                                                                                                              (17) 
 
where the prime denotes a derivative. Totally differentiating equation (16), we get 
'( ) ( ) '( ) ( )
0
m
L L L L
L
CS p p p CS p
dp
d
π π π
γ
⎡ ⎤− − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦= <Γ                               (18) 
The negotiated price is decreasing in the bargaining power of the government of country 
L.  
( ) '( )'( ) (1 ) ( )
0
L L
L L
L
d p d pCS p CS pdp dt dt
dt
π πγ γ− − −
= <Γ                        (19) 
 
The negotiated price is decreasing in the transaction cost of the parallel trader. With a 
higher transaction cost, the quantity of parallel trade is lower; this means a smaller profit 
loss in the high price market; therefore, the firm is more willing to accept a lower 
negotiated price in the low price market.   
 
'( ) ( ) '( ) ( )( ) '( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) '( )m L L LL L L
L
dCS p d p d p dCS pp CS p CS p p
d d ddp
d
π πγ π π γ γ γ πα α α
α
⎡ ⎤− − − − − − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦= Γ
L
L dα                                        
(20)                              
                                                                     
Hence 
1
lim 0Ldp
dγ α→ <  and 0lim 0
Ldp
dγ α→ > . That means that a larger market size leads to a 
lower negotiated price if the government in country L has high bargaining power. With a 
larger market size in country L, it is easier for the firm to recover the profit lost in 
country H. Therefore, the firm is more willing to accept a lower price in the negotiation. 
When the firm has high bargaining power, it will try to take advantage of price 
discrimination and charge a higher price. A relatively larger market will be more likely to 
accept a higher price. 
                                                 
6 The result is based on equations (6) and (7) but expressed in general equation form for simplicity. 
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 The effects of a change in γ , α  or t on a firm’s total profit are shown by the 
differentiations: 
 
'( ) 0LL
dpd p
d d
π πγ γ= <                                                                              (21) 
 
'( ) 0LL L
pd p p
d
π πα α
∂= + >∂                                                                      (22) 
 
'( ) 0H L
pd p
dt t t
Lππ π∂ ∂= + >∂ ∂                                                                   (23) 
 
The firm’s profit is decreasing in the bargaining power of government L, and 
increasing in the market size and the transaction costs to parallel trader. For the firm, the 
benefits from an increase of α  or t depend on its bargaining power. In both equation (22) 
and (23), the first term is positive and the second term is negative. '( )Lpπ is greater than 
zero in the relevant range. '( ) 0Lpπ = is only possible when the firm has all bargaining 
power. Equations (22) and (23) are minimized to zero when the firm has zero bargaining 
power. The firm’s profit is ¼ whatever the α  or t is. As the firm’s bargaining power goes 
up, the equilibrium price Lp  also goes up, and then '( )Lpπ is smaller. Therefore, the 
second terms in both equations are less negative.  
 Because the effect of a change in t on consumer surplus in country L is entirely 
determined by its effect on Lp , a larger t increases consumer surplus. If the government in 
country L has most of the bargaining power, consumer surplus is increasing inα . If the 
firm has most of the bargaining power, consumer surplus is also increasing inα  since 
Lp
α
∂
∂  is always smaller than one. 
 
A comparison between parallel trade and no parallel trade regimes  
 In the above analysis, we assume parallel trade is legally permitted in both 
countries L and H. In this section, at first, I assume that parallel trade is not legally 
permitted, and then compare firm’s profits and social welfare of the two countries if 
parallel trade is legally permitted. 
 When there is no parallel trade, the firm and the government in country L solve 
 
1
( ) ( )
NT
L
NT NT
L L L
p
Max CS p p
γ γπ −⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎤⎦                                                        (24) 
                           
where I denote the equilibrium price under no parallel trade regime as 
NT
Lp , for the given 
demand, the solution of equation (24) is 
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(1 )
2
NT
Lp
α γ−=                                                                                  (25) 
 
The corresponding profit is 
 
2 21 (1
4 4
NT )α γπ −= +                                                                      (26) 
 
If the two countries move from no parallel trade regime to parallel trade regime, we 
are interested on the changes of firm’s profits and social welfare. In country L, if the only 
concern of the government is consumer surplus, we just need to find out the change of 
equilibrium prices between two regimes. In the presence of parallel trade, in order to 
compensate the firm’s profit loss in country H, there must be an increase of price in 
country L, . And the magnitude of 0NTL L Lp p pΔ = − > pΔ  depends on the bargaining 
power of each party. 
 
( ) 0
2
NT
L L L Ld p d p p dp
d d d
α
γ γ γ
Δ −= = + >                                                 (27)7
 
From the analysis in the last section, we know when 0γ = , there is an increase of the 
equilibrium price in market L in the presence of parallel trade, and we also 
know 0Ld p
dγ
Δ > ; therefore, for any given value ofγ , there is an increase of the negotiated 
price in the presence of parallel trade ( 0LpΔ > ). The increase of price has two effects: 
increasing firm’s profit in country L, and reducing the quantity of parallel trade. 
Therefore, the consumer surplus falls, and then the social welfare in country L is lower 
under parallel trade. The higher the bargaining powers of the government in country L, 
the larger the change in the equilibrium price, and hence the consumer surplus. Therefore, 
parallel trade undermines the high bargaining power of the government in country L. 
 
 For 0 1γ< < , the impact of parallel trade on firm’s profit is ambiguous. 
Differentiating πΔ  with respect toγ , we have 
 
2( ) (
2
NTd d d
d d d
)π π π π γαγ γ γ
Δ −= = − −                                             (28) 
where '( ) 0LL
dpd p
d d
π πγ γ= <  
 
The firm’s profit is decreasing in the bargaining power of government L in both regimes: 
with or without parallel trade. Therefore, both the first and second term in equation (28) 
                                                 
7 Please see the proof in appendix 3 
 17
are negative. From the above analysis, we know the impact of parallel trade on the firm’s 
profit at two extreme cases. When the firm has all bargaining power ( 0γ = ), it suffers a 
profit loss. The firm cannot fully take the advantage of price discrimination in the 
presence of parallel trade. When the firm has no bargaining power at all ( 1γ = ), its profit 
is unchanged in the presence of parallel trade. Therefore, we have 
 
0
lim 0d
dγ
π
γ→
Δ < , 
1
lim 0d
dγ
π
γ→
Δ =                                                             (29) 
                                                    
The firm tends to have a larger profit when it has high bargaining powers ( 0γ → ), since 
its ability of price discrimination is undermined by the parallel trade. If the firm’s bargain 
power is low ( 1γ → ), the impact of parallel trade on firm’s profit is small. 
 Under parallel trade, the consumer surplus in country H is higher. The quantity of 
supply goes up and price goes down with parallel trade. If the social welfare in country H 
is simply defined as the sum of firm’s profit and consumer surplus, it could be higher 
under parallel trade when the firm has low or no bargaining power in country L.  When 
the firm has high bargaining power in country L, the consumer surplus in country H is 
still higher, but the firm will suffer higher profit loss; therefore, the effect on total social 
welfare in country H is ambiguous.  
 A summary of the results is presented in Table 1.  
 
4. Conclusion, Policy Implications, and Discussion 
In the presence of parallel trade, the pharmaceutical firm has to compete with the 
parallel trader in the high price market so that the profit of the firm in the high price 
market falls. In order to compensate for the loss in the high price market, the firm will 
bargain harder with the government in the low price country, and the price of the drug in 
the low price country will rise. If the market size in country L is so small that the firm’s 
best profits when it sells in both markets are smaller than mπ , the firm will cut off the 
supply to market L. Therefore, there will be a social welfare loss incurred from parallel 
trade.  
 When the demands are different in the two markets and the pharmaceutical firm 
has high bargaining power in the price negotiation, the firm’s profits fall because its 
ability to price discriminate is undermined by parallel trade. The firm’s total profit is 
maximized if it can fully take advantage of price discrimination. The result of an 
increasing of the firm’s profits in Pecorino (2002) is the outcome of identical demands in 
two markets, which implies that the only source of price differential is from price 
regulation. However, when the price differential results not only from price regulation, 
but also from different demands in the two markets, the firm suffers a profit loss under 
parallel trade.  
When the firm earns very little profit from the low price market because of low 
bargaining power, the impact of parallel trade on its profit won’t be large. Under parallel 
trade, the consumer surplus in the high price country goes up since the price of the drug is 
lower. Therefore, the short run social welfare in the high price country could be higher if 
the firm’s bargaining power in the low price country is low.  
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Policy Implications 
 
The government in country L  
If the market size of the drug in country L is too small, the firm may cut off the 
drug supply to country L. The decision is sensitive toα and t . If the market size is large 
enough and the firm decides to accommodate parallel trade, as shown in the last section, 
the negotiated price is also sensitive toα  and . Therefore, those factors have policy 
implications for the government in country L. 
t
When the government in country L has high bargaining power, the firm’s 
minimum acceptable price in the presence of parallel trade is decreasing inα . The 
government in country L has the power to influenceα . For example, the government 
could subsidize the target population of the drug in the question, manipulate the 
consumer’s insurance status and co-payment rates, and put the drug on the formulary of a 
public drug plan. Those actions will increase the maximal willingness to pay and 
decrease the demand elasticity for the drug, so that the market will be more important and 
attractive to the firm; therefore, it will be willing to accept a lower price in the 
negotiation. When the government in country L has low bargaining power, the firm’s 
optimal price in the presence of parallel trade is increasing inα . If the goal is a lower 
price level, the government in country L could remove the drug from the formulary of a 
public drug plan, or reduce the subsidy to the target population of this drug. A more 
straightforward option in all cases is to manipulate the transaction cost to the parallel 
trader. This action could achieve the same goal on the negotiated price without affecting 
the demand and supply of the drug. An increase in the unit transaction cost to the parallel 
traders will reduce the amount of parallel trade, and subsequently lead to a lower price 
which is acceptable to the firm. One option is a unit tax (or regulation fee) on the parallel 
exportation.  
 
The government in country H    
Before the presence of parallel trade, when the government in country L has all 
the bargaining power, the firm obtains very little profit from market L. In the presence of 
parallel trade, in order to induce the firm to supply the drug, the government in country L 
has to offer a higher price. The firm’s total profit is the same as before. However, the 
consumer surplus is increased in country H. That is similar to a transfer of consumer 
surplus from country L to country H. The social welfare is higher in country H in the 
presence of parallel trade. Therefore, if the drug price is strictly regulated in country L, 
legalization of parallel trade could be a policy option for the government in country H to 
undermine the foreign drug price regulation.  
 Before the presence of parallel trade, if the firm has high bargaining power in the 
low price country and the demands are different in the two markets, the firm can take the 
advantage of price discrimination to maximize its profit. If parallel trade is legalized in 
the high price country, the firm’s capacity for price discrimination is undermined. 
Therefore, it will suffer a profit loss. But the consumer surplus in country H will go up. 
The total short run effect on social welfare is ambiguous. If we take into account 
considerations of the firm’s R&D, the long-run social welfare in country H is unknown. 
Therefore, the policy maker should be cautious about the legalization of parallel trade. 
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Discussion 
There are several questions that need to be explored further in the future. 
 
Country L’s social welfare function 
In this paper, I consider a very basic form of short-run social welfare function for 
the government in country L in which includes only consumer surplus. However, the 
policy maker very rarely uses such a social welfare function. In reality, there are many 
other concerns in the price negotiation process, such as the need for research and 
development of pharmaceuticals, containing health care cost and maybe some other 
vague political factors. It is difficult to clearly define a social welfare function if we take 
into account these long run concerns. Moreover, the social welfare function could change 
in the presence of parallel trade. For example, the social welfare function may contain 
considerations about the R&D of pharmaceuticals before the presence of parallel trade. 
However, in the presence of parallel trade, consumer surplus may become the only 
concern of the policy maker in country L because of the higher drug price and budgetary 
pressure. If the social welfare function has other components before the presence of 
parallel trade, the negotiated price is not the lowest price that the firm will accept. For 
example, when the bargaining power all resides with the government in country L, the 
equilibrium price would be higher than the firm’s marginal cost. If this is the case, the 
social welfare in country L is not necessarily worse off in the presence of parallel trade.  
 
The Profit of the Parallel Trader 
Country L also has the opportunity to increase social welfare by extracting profits 
from the parallel trader. To induce the firm to continue supplying to market L, the 
negotiated price in the presence of parallel trade has to be increased. This will lead to a 
certain level of social welfare loss, however, if the loss can be compensated by the profit 
extracted from the parallel trader, country L could still be better off.  
 
Bargaining Power 
In this study, we assume that the bargaining power is exogenous. In the presence 
of parallel trade, the bargaining power may become endogenous. The impact of parallel 
trade on the bargaining power of each party in the negotiation needs to be further 
explored.   
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Appendix 
1. 
2 2
9 (5 9 4 )1
28 5(5 9 4 ) 56( 2 )
4
Lp t
t t t
α
α α
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪∂ + −⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬∂ ⎪ ⎪+ − + + −⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 
0α >∵ , 1
2
t <  
5 9 4 1tα⇒ + − >  
and 2 52 0
4
t t+ − <  
2 2
(5 9 4 ) 1
5(5 9 4 ) 56( 2 )
4
t
t t t
α
α
+ −⇒ >
+ − + + −
 
Therefore 
0Lpα
∂ <∂  
 
2. 
2 2
4 (5 9 4 ) 14( 1)1
28 5(5 9 4 ) 56( 2 )
4
Lp t
t
t t t
α
α
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪∂ + − −⎪ ⎪= − −⎨ ⎬∂ ⎪ ⎪+ − + + −⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
t +    
2 2
(5 9 4 ) (5 9 )( 1) 15(5 9 4 ) 4(5 9 )( 2 )
4
t t
t t t
α β
α β
+ − − + + < −
+ − + + + −
∵  (As shown below) 
0Lp
dt
∂∴ <  
 
 
        
2 2
(5 9 4 ) 14( 1) 1
5(5 9 4 ) 56( 2 )
4
t t
t t t
α
α
+ − − + < −
+ − + + −
 
 
Proof: 
∵  2 2 2 5[(5 9 4 ) 14( 1)] [(5 9 4 ) 56( 2 )]
4
t t t t tα α+ − − + − + − + + −  
2 22 ( 1) ( 2 1) 0t t t tα⇒ − + + + + > , because 1α <  
∴  2 2 5(5 9 4 ) 14( 1) (5 9 4 ) 56( 2
4
t t t t tα α+ − − + > + − + + − )  
Because of the same condition 1α < , we have 
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(5 9 4 ) 14( 1) 0t t
∴
α+ − − + <  
2 2
(5 9 4 ) (5 9 )( 1) 15(5 9 4 ) 4(5 9 )( 2 )
4
t t
t t t
α β
α β
+ − − + + < −
+ − + + + −
 
 
 
3. ( )
2
NT
L L L Ld p d p p dp
d d d
α
γ γ γ
Δ −= = + 1 is minimized atγ =  when 0 1γ< <  
 
Since 
2
( ) ( ) '( ) ( ) . ( ) "( ) ( )( )
0
m mL
L L L L L L L
dp Q p p p CS p p p CS pd
d
d
π π π β π π πγ
γ
⎧ ⎫ ⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − + − −⎨ ⎬ ⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭ ⎩ ⎭= <Γ
 
we know  
 
1
lim 0Ld p
dγ γ→
Δ >  
 
Therefore  
 
0Ld p
dγ
Δ >  for 0 1γ< <  
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α  t  
 γ
 
0γ =  1γ = 0 1γ< < 0γ =  1γ = 0 1γ< <
Lp  ↓  ↑  ↓  Decided by γ  ↓  ↓  ↓  
CS  ↑  ↑  ↑  ↑  ↑  ↑  ↑  
π  ↓  ↑  - ↑  ↑  - ↑  
Table-1, summary of results 
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